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Abstract 
This thesis uses discourse to analyze how different story-lines of  hydropower development in the 
Mekong River Basin reproduce the concept of  sustainable development. With actors advocating 
sometimes diametrically opposite development paths resulting in different social, economic and 
environmental trade-offs they all refer to and motivate their agendas in terms of  sustainable 
development. I applied a qualitative approach facilitated through semi-structured interviews to 
engage multiple actors in the discourses of  hydropower. Using the concepts of  story-lines, discursive 
elements and discursive closure I investigate three tracks in the debate on hydropower development 
pertaining to Cambodia’s downstream position on the Mekong River. By problematizing the 
concept of  sustainable development in regard to hydropower, the thesis demonstrates how its 
ambiguity can propel debate and I argue that the concept’s vagueness is to be seen a potential 
strength rather than a weakness. The thesis found that strong hydropower proponents tend to 
emphasis economic aspects of  sustainable development succeeded by the environmental and social. 
Opponents on the other hand demonstrated a reversed tendency while a middle-track expresses 
difficulties in connecting the two extremes. 
Keywords: Hydropower, Cambodia, Mekong River, Sustainable Development, Story-lines, 
Discursive Closure, Discursive Elements. 
Word count: 16,421 
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ADB  Asia Development Bank                     
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations                
BOT  Build-Operate-Transfer                     
CSO Civil Society Organization                      
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment                       
GMS  Greater Mekong Sub-region                    
HSAP  Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol                   
IHA  International Hydropower Association                      
IMC Interim Mekong Committee                       
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LMB Lower Mekong Basin                      
MC  Mekong Committee                       
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MoE  Ministry of Environment                     
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MRC Mekong River Commission                     
NGO Non-governmental Organization                     
PEC Power Engineering Consulting                       
RGC Royal Government of Cambodia                      
UMB Upper Mekong Basin                     
UN United Nations                        
UNCTAD United Nations Conference On Trade And Development                
WCD  World Commission on Dams                    
WWF  World Wildlife Fund for Nature                   
CO2 Carbondioxide                        
CH4 Methane                        
ha Hectare                          
km Kilometer                         
km2 Square Kilometer                      
km3 Cubic Kilometer                      
kWh Kilowatt hour                      
MW Megawatt                       
GW Gigawatt                      
Riparian here referes to a nation state situated on the 
banks of the Mekong River. As such, the Lower Mekong 
Basin Riparians are Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Viet 
Nam while the Greater Mekong Subregion also include 
China and Myanmar.  
Mainstream here refers to the dominant stream of the 
Mekong River, as contrasted to its tributaries. 
Tributary here refers to a stream or river that flows into 
the mainstream of the Mekong River contributing to its 
flow.  
Flood-leveler refers to the capacity of a water-body to 
ingest an increased flow in the rainy season to mitigate 
flooding. Here it primarily refers to the Tonle Sap Lake in 
Cambodia. 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) is a contract form 
frequently used in hydroelectric projects in developing 
countries. Usually a private entity receives a concession 
from the state to finance, design, construct, and operate 
the plant for the time period set out in the contract 
whereafter it is handed back to the state. A usual BOT 
concession spans over 20-40 years. 
Run-of-the-river is a type of hydroelectricity where little 
or no water at all is stored. There are no universal 
standards for how much, or the number of days, water 
can be stored for a hydropower plant to still be 
considered run-of-the-river. 
Installed capacity is the maximum capacity that a 
hydroelectric plant is designed to run at. 
Firm capacity is the amount of energy that a can be 
guaranteed to be available for production or 
transmission from a hydroelectric plant at any given time.
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Outline 
The Mekong River is one of  the largest and longest rivers in the world and among the most pristine 
and diverse ecosystems.  The River Basin and its tributaries are crucial for a significant part of  the 1
Basin’s population and the River’s ecosystems’ health therefore almost directly reflects the wellbeing 
and economic prosperity of  the people living within it having great impact on cultures and 
traditions (Backer, 2007; Keskinen et al., 2008; Molle et al., 2009; Taylor, 2010). 
Historically, and in present time, the Mekong River has simultaneously been a crucial element for 
economic development in the region, largely by supporting the largest freshwater fishery on the 
planet of  circa 2.3 million tons per year (Mekong River Commission, 2010; Molle et al., 2009). Of  
the approximately 60 million people living in the Lower Mekong Basin an estimated 85% reside in 
rural areas and 60% depend directly on the river, mainly through small-scale or even subsistence 
livelihoods (Conservation International, 2014; Fox and Sneddon 2005; Mekong River Commission, 
2010; Öjendal et al., 2012).  
Three of  the River’s riparians — Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar — are Least Developed 
Countries. An estimated 25% of  the population live below the poverty line making poverty 
alleviation a central development imperative in the region. Cambodia is the second most 
downstream riparian and one the least developed countries in the world (UNCTAD, 2014; Öjendal 
et al., 2012). 
Cambodia has 86% of  its territory within the basin and the Cambodian population is heavily 
dependent on the River’s resources, in particular fishery and those provided by wetlands (Backer, 
2007; Dore 2003; Tyler, 2010). The Mekong River works in cyclic tandem with the Tonle Sap Lake 
in Cambodia producing an annual flood pulse crucial to sustain fisheries and agriculture by bringing 
sediments and nutrients and serving as a breeding ground for many fish species (Keskinen et al., 
2008). 
The Mekong River is also seen as an energy source for the countries along the river. The surge in 
hydropower dam projects in the Mekong River Basin has been described as paramount and chiefly 
#  “It is estimated that the Mekong region has 20,000 different plant species, 430 mammal, 1200 bird, 800 reptile and amphibian and 850 fish species 1
making it one of  the richest in biodiversity worldwide containing 16 WWF Global 200 ecoregions, which is the most dense concentration in mainland 
Asia. New species are discovered all the time, only between 1997 and 2007 1068 species were found excluded invertebrates” (Taylor, 2010: 23).
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for energy transformation to electricity to outweigh the high dependence on imported fossil fuels in 
the Lower Mekong Basin (Molle, 2009; Taylor, 2010). The Mekong River Commission estimates up 
to 71 new large-scale hydropower projects on Lower Mekong Basin tributaries by 2030 together 
with a renewed interest in mainstream dams, particularly in China’s Yunnan province and in Laos 
(Mekong River Commission, 2010, 2011; Öjendal et al., 2012). Recent developments in Laos have 
seen fierce criticism from Vietnamese and Cambodian delegates to the Mekong River Commission 
as well as becoming a matter of  controversy of  development potential and possible impacts in 
domestic and regional politics (Trandem, 2015).  
High dependency on imported energy and fossil fuels forms a basic rationale for hydropower 
development and is generally seen by riparian governments as being a cheap and clean(er) energy 
source providing government revenue as part of  wider poverty reduction and development plans 
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Figure 1.1 The Mekong River Basin and Mainstream Dams
Source: http://imgkid.com/mekong-river-map.shtml
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(Ansar et al., 2014; Keskinen, 2008; Mekong Watch, 2013; Royal Government of  Cambodia, 2004; 
Taylor, 2010). However, current trends can be understood as a dual imperative, and dilemma as 
large-scale hydropower dams also have negative impacts, e.g. displacing communities and disrupting 
livelihoods, a source for conflict, biodiversity loss and changed quality and quantity of  water flows 
which may affect nutrients and sediments transportation (Baird, 2014; Jackson, 2014; Gätke et al, 
2013; Mekong Watch, 2013; Ryan & Goichot 2011; Searin, 2006). The thesis aims to understand 
these tradeoffs by analyzing competing discursive story-lines on hydropower development as 
proposed by civil society, government, researchers and development partners. 
1.2 Research Problem 
Poverty in the Lower Mekong Basin and economic development potential of  the Mekong River calls 
for hydropower development throughout the region while high dependency on riverine ecosystems 
and uncertainty of  impacts simultaneously call for its protection. This presents a dual development-
protection imperative and it has be argued that current hydroelectric trends come with tradeoffs 
between economic, social and environmental development elements (Hansson et al., 2012). 
Regardless of  which tradeoffs are advocated actors refer to and motivate their agendas in terms of  
sustainable development (cf. e.g. Frey & Linke, 2002; Mekong River Commission, 2010; Middleton, 
2008; Sinohydro, 2012; Royal Government of  Cambodia, 2004; World Bank & Asian Development 
Bank, 2006; World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 2015).  
Sustainable development interprets through actors’ social, political and cognitive commitments 
leading to more than one possible path of  what development, or which aspect(s) in a development 
process is to be sustained. The concept’s ambivalence and actors’ alternative interpretations thereof  
have resulted in adherence to similar and sometimes identical terminology while making antipodal 
conclusions of  hydroelectricity’s role in sustainable development.  
The concept’s ambiguity is described by Hajer (1995) who perceive sustainable development as a 
“story-line that has made it possible to create the first global discourse-coalition [emphasis added] /…/ 
that shares a way of  talking about environmental matters but includes members with widely 
differing social and cognitive commitments” (ibid.: 14). Given the Mekong’s social and cultural 
importance, environmental richness and economic development potential, its future engage a vast 
number of  actors. By adhering and contributing to the reproduction of  various story-lines they 
struggle to obtain the interpretative prerogative of  sustainable development of  the river. 
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In this thesis I will investigate key actors’ positions to hydropower development in the Mekong River 
Basin from a Cambodian perspective. The purpose is to empirically investigate discourse — through 
the use of  story-lines — as integral to the realities of  hydropower and thereby contribute to a 
clarification of  varying claims of  hydroelectricity’s role in leading a sustainable development in 
Southeast Asia.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The following research questions guide the thesis in reaching its aim and purpose. 
1. How is the concept of  sustainable development reproduced through the narratives on hydropower 
development in Cambodia? 
a. What discursive elements of  hydropower development do the different actors pay importance 
to? 
b. What narratives and story-lines do actors draw upon to describe hydropower development? 
1.4 Disposition 
The following chapter presents the methodological approaches used to execute the thesis. Chapter 3 
presents the conceptual and analytical framework followed by a discussion of  the historic 
importance, current status and trends in regard to the Mekong, its people and hydroelectric 
development in Chapter 4. Thereafter Chapter 5 presents an analysis of  primary data using the 
story-line approach. In Chapter 6 I discuss the findings and Chapter 7 presents some concluding 
remarks.  
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2. Method 
To answer the research questions set out above and achieve the thesis’ aim and purpose a qualitative 
methodology is adopted by combining semi-structured interviews and a review of  news articles and 
documents. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a wide variety of  stakeholders and 
constitute the primary data material while academic articles, reports and English language news 
articles made up the secondary data material. Due to the character of  the primary data material 
and a discourse analysis approach a social constructivist relational ontology together with an 
interpretivist epistemology were found suitable (cf. Chapter 3). 
Clear referencing and extensive quotation contributes to a transparent presentation of  primary and 
secondary data to the extent possible. Representation of  a wide variety of  actors — all informants 
speak for prominent actors reproducing the discourse — awards the thesis satisfactory validity and 
reliability. 
2.1 Primary Data 
2.1.1 Fieldwork 
Fieldwork was conducted from February 1st to April 19th 2015. This proved to be a fortunate time to 
engage in the field for administrative reasons as well as two topical events. Firstly, early in the year 
many state and non-state actors are engaged in planning and reporting activities meaning they are 
relatively easy to access in respective offices. Although a number of  meetings had to be re- and re-
re-scheduled it is believed to have been a more prominent later in the year. Secondly, two events of  
interest coincided with the fieldwork phase. On March 2, 2015, a dam opposition activist was 
deported from Cambodia (cf. e.g. Lei & Sovan, 2015; Lipes, 2015) stimulating a wide public debate 
and Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen spent time on the issue in an address to government 
officials in Phnom Penh (cf. Reaksmey, 2015). Thus the event increased both the topicality and the 
sensitivity of  the subject matter. March 17-18, 2015, I was invited to partake in the final “National 
Consultation Workshop of  the Draft of  Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law” in Phnom 
Penh providing ample space for networking as well as insight in relevant ongoing legislative 
processes (cf. e.g. NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2015; Baird, 2015). 
Primary data was collected between February 4th and April 8th in face-to-face meetings in Thailand 
(Bangkok and Chiang Mai) and Cambodia (Phnom Penh, Saen Monorom and Kampot), and via 
Skype, phone and email with respondents in Ratanakiri and Stung Treng, Cambodia; and, 
Vientiane, Laos. Informants represent Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working in or towards 
#  of  #5 51
Johannes Nilsson CHAPTER TWO | METHOD
Cambodia, administrative bodies and ministries of  the Royal Government of  Cambodia (RGC), 
development partners to Cambodia, university scholars and independent researchers. This 
represents my effort to achieve a heterogeneous sample to maximize the set of  opinions (Creswell 
2007). In total 47 individuals contributed to the study and notes were taken during all interviews 
although more studiously when the interview was not being recorded. Recorded interviews were 
transcribed in part where the respondent talked on the subject, hence a selective transcription. All 
interviews were conducted in English. The respondents’ level of  English together with the 
researcher's basic skills in Khmer deemed an interpreter unnecessary (cf. Appendix III). 
Respondents were primarily approached via email or phone directly. In several cases former 
colleagues or a previous respondent acted as “gatekeepers” facilitating the introduction (Bryman, 
2012a: 435; Moyser, 2006). Hence, strategic “snowball sampling” allowed other relevant informants 
to be identified from an initial small group (Bryman, 2012a: 202). Civil society and academia were 
easy to approach and thus compose a larger portion of  total respondents than other stakeholders (cf. 
Appendix III). Establishing contact with hydropower development-relevant ministries, government 
administrative agencies, representatives of  regional cooperation bodies and some development 
partners to Cambodia required more time but were ultimately positive. 
Efforts to reach out to the private sector were made possible towards the end of  the research after 
necessary contact details had been acquired. Outreach was conducted through online contact forms, 
direct email and phone, participation in the EIA Consultation and finally by showing up on two 
private sector actors’ door step. 
Private sector outreach through online contact forms, direct emails and phone calls went 
unanswered. Participation in the EIA Consultation allowed only for non-hydropower related private 
sector contacts. Attempts to approach company compounds were interrupted by armed guards in 
three cases. In one case, after some convincing, one of  the armed guards agreed to seek the 
possibility for me to briefly meet with a company representative. Approximately 20 minutes later the 
guard came back saying “No, all busy. From China, no speak English. [They] have no time. 
[author’s translation from Khmer, likely broken]”. On proposing I could come back in the afternoon 
the guard replied “Nooooo. Impossible. You [better] go now”. 
One visit was conducted to an in-operation hydropower plant and efforts to acquire formal approval 
to visit a construction site were made to allow for first-hand experience and consult local 
communities. At the in-operation hydropower plant armed personnel at military checkpoints 
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interrupted me from reaching the site from both sides of  the river. With this experience in mind and 
another researchers’ testimony to similar difficulties I decided not to approach the construction site 
without first acquiring a formal government approval. The request was left with the Ministry in 
charge on March 13, 2015, and I received the Minister’s answer on April 22, 2015, appreciating my 
interest in hydropower noting that the case “is not an appropriate site to your thesis” (cf. Appendix 
IV). 
At the in-operation hydropower plant efforts were also made to reach out to local communities in its 
close proximity. Villagers were generally skeptic to talk but one group/family shared a brochure that 
they had received from the project developer upon the hydropower plants completion. These 
outreaches were done by the author in Khmer and there is a possibility — although unlikely as I am 
positive to having heard them speak Khmer with one another — that the villagers approached did 
not speak Khmer. With close to five years experience living and working in and towards Cambodia 
the villagers’ unwillingness to converse on any topic was a first-time experience. Neither the case of  
me being white, nor clothes or mean of  transportation have previously resulted in similar hesitance 
to engage with me as a foreigner, especially not when speaking Khmer. Not representing a familiar 
CSO or government body may have contributed to this hesitance although I deem it unlikely.  
In summary, 47 individuals contributed to the study representing 14 civil society organizations, 10 
international consultants, 5 bodies of  the Royal Government of  Cambodia, 4 development partners, 
and 4 researchers. No hydropower plant construction company, developer, concessionaire or 
operator were interviewed. No villagers except those mentioned in the previous paragraph were 
consulted. 
2.1.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
A semi-structured interview approach was used to allow space for the respondent and give the 
researcher flexibility in reiteration and elaboration. As Bryman (2012a) notes, it is the “[o]pen-
ended, discursive nature of  the interviews which permits an iterative process of  refinement” (ibid.: 
472) enabling the respondent to interpret and speak freely while the researcher, in a hermeneutic 
manner, can readdress initial aspects in tangent with the respondent’s ongoing elaborations. A set of  
pre-formulated open-ended questions served to keep the interview on topic (ibid.; cf. Appendix II). 
An elite interview approach was seen most appropriate to discover the reproduction of  discourses 
(Moyser, 2006). Interviews were primarily held at the respondent’s office. This was done for two 
reasons. First, it places the respondent in a familiar place where she is likely to feel secure. This is 
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believed to have been important as hydropower development can be seen as a sensitive topic due to 
recent events (cf. e.g. Lei & Sovan, 2015; Lipes, 2015; Muyhong, 2015; Reaksmey, 2015). Second, it 
granted the possibility to get introduced to additional informants or acquire material for the study 
directly from the respondent’s office. The approach proved successful in both aspects. 
2.1.3 Primary Data Analysis 
During the data collection phase notes were continuously taken and key points from respective 
interview, outstanding quotes and the researchers initial thoughts were summarized into a 
spreadsheet shortly after the interview. Prior to finalization of  the data collection phase clusters of  
positions and interpretations (story-lines) to hydropower had started to emerge and thus begun a 
structured formation of  such clusters (cf. 5.1 Narratives of  Meaning) using Munasinghe’s (1993) 
sustainable development triangle for a thematic distribution. No acknowledgement of  what sector 
the actor represented was taken in this step allowing multi-sector clusters whereafter the analysis 
commenced according to Hajer's (1995) argumentative approach to analyzing discourse (cf. section 
3.2). The final product of  this process is presented in Chapter 5. 
2.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data was attained from a wide range of  sources related to hydropower development in 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region — with a particular focus on Cambodia — allowing a 
comprehensive contextual scope (Creswell, 2007: 73). A presentation of  the secondary data is used 
to explain the background of  hydropower in the region and Cambodia in Chapter 4. Documents 
consulted include legal documents; online news paper articles; position papers; reports; and, 
published research (cf. e.g. Electricity Authority of  Cambodia, 2013; Gätke et al., 2013; 
International Rivers, 2013; Jude, 2013; Mekong River Commission, 2010; Rasmey, 2014; Royal 
Government of  Cambodia, 2004; Keskinen et al., 2008; Taylor, 2010). 
2.3 Reflection of  Selected Methods 
The selected approach to primary and secondary data collection for the thesis generated a 
significant amount of  highly relevant documents and interviews. The open ended approach — i.e. 
setting out to gather the respondent’s perspective on the subject matter by letting her speak freely 
within certain topical restraints — resulted in deliberations on multiple aspects of  the topic allowing 
the respondent’s perspective to be presented, i.e. what she chose to talk about and how. While being 
a successful approach in gathering information on respondents’ perspectives, the amount of  
material acquired did at a certain point become close to overwhelming leading to halt further 
investigation.  
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In meetings with informants I refrained from taking a stance for or against hydropower. With most 
informants, and in particular wholeheartedly or semi-hydropower friendly informants the not-
choosing-sides approach proved successful. With some strong hydropower opponents I was met with 
skepticism for not taking a position against dams. Thus, the approach had both strengths and 
weaknesses but I believe taking sides would have limited my ability in acquiring meetings with the 
diverse range of  informants that was finally achieved. It would also have limited the thesis’ validity.  
Another challenge is due to limited representativeness of  the data in relation to positions of  villagers 
and the private sector. No villager or private sector actor are represented in the analysis of  primary 
data meaning that potentially important perspectives are not included in the thesis. Positions of  
rural village residents’ are in part reflected through some civil society groups working with grassroots 
although it is recognized not all villagers adhere to these positions. Lacking representativeness of  
private sector positions is handled to a certain extent as these actors are represented online through 
their websites and that their agenda can be seen through other hydropower proponents part of  the 
study. 
As respondents are not an account of  the entirety of  actors the thesis cannot be seen as 
representative of  “bewildering variety of  separate discursive component parts of  a problem” (Hajer, 
1995: 56). Nevertheless, throughout the fieldwork phase efforts were made to reproduce the diversity 
and multiplicity of  stakeholders in sampling individuals, organizations and institutions to the largest 
possible extent. While the number of  civil society respondents are higher than those of  other sectors 
nuances within the sector must be emphasized meaning that this is not a coherent group. Also, the 
case that half  of  respondents are not nationals of  an LMB riparian cause for two readings. First, it 
suggests that the discourse is significantly reproduced by external actors. Second, it raises the 
question to the sample being representative of  actors reproducing the discourses. I argue the sample 
is representative of  the societal sectors focused, acknowledging that some sectors, and thereby 
possible discourses, are left out (cf. Appendix III).  
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
For the purpose of  transparency each meeting commenced by a personal introduction of  the author 
and his present and previous affiliation  followed by a short presentation of  the thesis’ aim and 2
purpose. The respondent was further assured that her contribution, identity and affiliation would be 
 In 2010 I was part of  an exchange program between Cambodia and Sweden and from 2011-2013 I worked for the Swedish CSO Forum Syd at their 2
Southeast Asia office in Phnom Penh. 
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kept confidential. Everyone mentioned on the ‘Acknowledgement Page’ have given their consent. 
When allowed the interview was recorded with the premise that the sound file was for the 
researcher’s ears only (cf. Appendix I) . If  the respondent preferred, the author refrained from 3
recording and took notes. If  the respondent at any point during the interview wished to turn off  the 
recording it was and I retreated to taking notes. All respondents took part of  the study voluntarily. 
As such the thesis project was carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines as described by 
the Swedish Research Council (2009) (Bryman, 2012b). 
 None of  the respondents wished to use the informed consent form expressing trust in the author handling of  the recorded material 3
with care. 
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3. Analytical Framework 
This chapter lays out the thesis’ conceptual and analytical framework. It sets out by problematizing 
the concept of  sustainable development by an admission that its ambivalence constitutes its strength 
as well as its weakness. It then turns to the study of  the political processes using Hajer’s (1995) 
argumentative approach to analyzing discourse and the concepts of  story-lines, discourse-coalitions, 
discursive hegemony and discursive closure.  
3.1 Sustainable Development, A Contested Concept 
Sustainable development has come to be a prominent concept and commonplace in reference to 
distinctly different types of  development due to its implicit positive, but undefined, meaning (Savage, 
2006). However, while its strength may be derived from a multitude of  possible interpretations it has 
also been pointed out as the concept’s vague expedient without a clear traction of  its own (Daly, 
1990; Mebratu, 1998) and that “the emphasis of  conceptual development has shifted from logical 
coherence to that of  semantics” (Mebratu, 1998: 518).  
Daly (1990) suggests a demarcation between growth and development — where the former defines 
as a quantitative increase in size by addition and the latter a qualitative expansion by capacities — 
to return logical cohesion. Therefore, growth based in ecosystems and finite natural resources is 
impossible to sustain in the long-term leading Daly (1990) to state that “sustainable growth” is a 
“bad oxymoron” while “sustainable development is much more apt” (ibid.: 1). 
The argument hints at a Malthusian theory when Daly (1990) argues for high resource-usage 
countries to limit consumption and high population-growth countries to apply population control. 
Building on the argument of  development contra growth, poverty alleviation is likely to be more 
difficult without growth. Henceforth, radically speaking, poverty alleviation by development must, as 
a logical effect of  the argument, apply controls to population and increase wealth redistribution 
when overall growth is no longer an applicable mean (ibid.: 5). 
Operationalization of  the sustainable development concept for the thesis builds on the three pillars 
of  economic, social and environmental aspects to development (Munasinghe, 1993). The thesis 
however acknowledges more recent review of  the three pillars suggesting a ‘nested approach’ of  
inseparable elements (Griggs, et al.,2013). 
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3.2 An Argumentative Approach to Analyzing Discourse 
As a corrective to Foucault’s methodology of  discourse analysis and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, Hajer (1995) develops his argumentative approach to discourse analysis for a ‘middle-
ground’ approach to the study of  political processes. Here focus is given the concepts of  story-lines 
and discourse-coalitions, introduced through an ontological and epistemological demarcation of  the 
environment and the environmental conflict.  
3.2.1 The Environmental Conflict 
First, it is no longer the question of  whether or not there is an environmental crisis. Instead the 
environmental conflict “is essentially about its interpretation” (Hajer, 1995: 14). ‘Talking green’ has 
become an “inclusionary device” (ibid.: 14) rather than part of  a radical social critique. 
Correspondingly, the environmental conflict must be conceptualized as “a complex and continuous 
struggle over the definition and the meaning of  the environmental problem itself ” (ibid.: 14-15) and 
has as such become discursive. As “various actors are likely to hold different perceptions of  what the 
problem ‘really’ is” (ibid.: 43) it becomes imperative to investigate “which aspects of  social reality are 
included” (ibid.: 43) as there is no single problem or solution. 
Environmental issues bring together a wide range of  actors and modes of  speech that often involve 
discursive elements from various disciplines (ibid.: 45-46). Accordingly, ideas from one discourse 
become part of  an inter-discursive group of  actors carrying different discursive logic (ibid.: 46). To 
understand an environmental issue thus necessitates a combination of  knowledge produced in 
different discourses. Hajer (1995) argues that this is enabled by story-lines facilitating the debate 
where arguments primarily establish political power through their “multi-interpretability” rather 
than consistency (ibid.: 61). 
Consequently, an idea in environmental discourse “should not be seen as the product of  a linear, 
progressive, and value-free process” but rather as the result of  “a struggle between various 
unconventional political coalitions” (ibid.: 12). These coalitions are unconventional because they 
gather around specific story-lines rather than in parties or organizations and infers that actors 
producing story-lines are located beyond the traditional political sphere (ibid.: 66). Granted that 
“social action originates in human agency of  clever, creative human beings but in a context of  social 
structures of  various sorts that both enable and constrain their agency” (ibid.: 58) actors within 
coalitions are likely to have different interpretations of  meanings and implications of  a story-line.  
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The thesis as such appreciates that the environmental conflict is a social construction attributing to the 
material reality of  the environment and people living in it; “[t]his does not mean that nature ‘out there’ 
is totally irrelevant” (ibid.: 17). 
3.2.2 Story-lines 
A story-line is a “narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give 
meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” (ibid.: 56). In this way story-lines are key to 
defragment separate discursive elements of  a problem. This assumes that actor cognition of  an issue 
is not dependent on complete systems of  discourses but “rather evoked through story-lines” (ibid.: 
56). 
Story-lines have three functions. Firstly, in “facilitating the reduction of  the discursive complexity of  
a problem” (ibid.: 63). Secondly, story-lines give continuity and stability to the debate when an 
increasing number of  actors start using it. Thirdly, by providing a narrative, story-lines allow actors 
to expand their engagement and discursive understanding beyond their own expertise. Through its 
three functions story-lines have “an essential role in the clustering of  knowledge, the positioning of  
actors, and, ultimately, in the creation of  coalitions amongst the actors of  a given domain” (ibid.: 
63). 
The three functions of  story-lines are facilitated through the “interpretive process of  ‘discursive 
closure’” (ibid.: 62) which reduces complex inter-disciplinary issues to a concentrated and simplified 
argument, e.g. “[a] visual representation or a catchy one-liner” (ibid.: 62). While the process of  
discursive closure is coupled with a decline of  detailed content to a degree where “all uncertainty 
and all conditionality of  the original knowledge claims is erased” (ibid.: 62) it establishes the story-
lines’ multi-interpretability necessary for communicating inter-discursive problems and thereby 
reinforce its political power (ibid.: 61). 
3.2.3 Discourse-coalitions  
The formation of  a discourse-coalition occurs in attempts to achieve discursive hegemony by actors 
that “for various reasons (!) are attracted to a specific (set of) story-lines” (ibid.: 65). Discourse-
coalitions are constituted by “(1) a set of  story-lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) 
the practices in which this discursive activity is based” (ibid.: 65). Actors in a discourse-coalition may 
identify themselves according to distinctly different discourses and the story-lines therefore become 
the “discursive cement that keeps a discourse-coalition together” (ibid.: 65).  
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A discourse is considered hegemonic in a certain domain when structuration and institutionalization has 
occurred. Discourse structuration is when the credibility of  actors in a certain domain are required to 
draw on the “ideas, concepts, and categories of  a given discourse” (Hajer, 1995: 60). Discourse 
institutionalization occurs when “a given discourse is translated into institutional 
arrangements” (Hajer, 1995: 61). 
Actors’ adherence to specific story-lines is explained by “‘discursive affinities’” (ibid.: 66). Suggesting 
that story-lines “operate on the middle ground between epistemes and individual construction” they 
neither acquire their “discursive power from the individual strategic choice” nor from “the fact that 
the specific elements fit together in a logical way” (ibid.: 66). What emerges are actors that do not 
necessarily understand the full complexity of  the argument but who argue “‘it sounds right’” (ibid.: 
67) based on the elements’ “similar cognitive or discursive structure which suggests that they belong 
together” (ibid.: 66f). Too strong discursive affinity — when discursive elements “flow into one 
another” — is called “‘discursive contamination’” (ibid.: 67). 
3.3 The Realities of  Sustainable Development 
In line with Hajer (1995) I therefore argue that we — inhabitants of  planet Earth — do not share 
the understanding of  the environment in the same way we share the planet. It would be incorrect to 
assume that “the natural environment that is discussed in environmental politics is equivalent to the 
environment ‘out there’” (ibid.: 16). Our shared understanding of  the environment is the product of  
a socio-cognitive struggle over the power of  certain story-lines. Hence,  
“sustainable development should also be analysed as a story-line that has made it possible to create the first global discourse-
coalition in environmental politics. A coalition that shares a way of  talking about environmental matters but includes members 
with widely differing social and cognitive commitments. The paradox is that this coalition for sustainable development can only 
be kept together by virtue of  its rather vague story-lines at the same time as it asks for radical social change.” (Hajer, 1995: 14) 
Consequently, reality “is always particular” and “dependent on subject-specific framing or time-and-
place specific discourses” (ibid.: 17) resulting in our “current understanding /…/ is just that: our 
current understanding” (ibid.: 17). In consonance, the thesis applies the argumentative approach to 
the contested meaning of  hydropower development situated within a global discourse-coalition of  
sustainable development. In doing so it aims to empirically investigate the realities of  hydropower 
development in the Mekong River Basin. 
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4. The Mekong, Cambodia, and Hydropower 
The chapter serves to give an overview of  the Mekong River’s importance in riparian economies, to 
its peoples and the environment. It centers on Cambodia, its position on the River and the status 
and trends of  hydropower development in the country. 
4.1 Importance of  the Mekong in Asia 
The Mekong River — the Mother of  Water  — is the eighth largest by volume and 12th longest 4
river in the world (Dore 2003: 16). With its 4,909 km it passes through six countries on its journey 
from Dzado county in the Kham region of  Tibet traversing Cambodia for 480 km before reaching 
the South China Sea in Viet Nam (Liu et al., 2009: 84). The river has throughout history 
contributed to shaping cultures, religions and ways of  life for over 100 ethnic groups (Backer, 2007: 
26; Molle et al., 2009 :1). Still to this day the Mekong River plays a central role in many cultures. 
Together with the Tonle Sap ecosystem it has the lead in the annual Cambodia water festival Bon 
Om Touk. 
The exceptional seasonal transformations due to the region’s monsoon climate is an important 
factor to its biodiversity. The River’s annual flooding is in itself  of  outmost importance for sustaining 
ecosystem diversity, particularly fish but also many other organisms. Hydropower will alter flows and 
it is suggested that a managed flood regime could not replace the natural variations between seasons 
(Taylor, 2010: 23).  
The Tonle Sap Lake — the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and known as the ‘Great Lake’ 
in Cambodia — and riverine ecosystems have been called “the heart of  the Mekong’s aquatic 
production” (Keskinen et al., 2008: 96). Concerns have been raised of  impacts to the Mekong Basin 
if  planned developments of  hydropower projects are realized in the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) 
(ibid.; Taylor, 2010).  
The Tonle Sap River acts as a tributary to the Mekong River during dry season but the approach of  
the wet monsoon season changes its character dramatically. The increase of  discharge in the 
Mekong mainstream leads it to overflow the Tonle Sap River causing its flow to reverse towards the 
Tonle Sap Lake. During the wet season the Lake’s area expands from approximately 2500 km2 to 
15,000 km2 and its volume from approximately 1.5 km3 to between 60 km3 and 70 km3. The River’s 
reversed flow brings nutrients and sediments to the lake that also serves as a flood-leveler. The Lake’s 
 The English name the “Mekong River” comes from the Thai and Lao word “Mae Nam Khong”. “Mae” meaning mother, “nam” 4
water. The Mekong River, or Mae Nam Khong, as such translates to Khong, The Mother of  Water” (Nguyen, 1999).
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expansion creates breeding ground for many fish species and thus serves important for livelihoods 
and food security; way beyond the Tonle Sap. At the end of  the monsoon the Tonle Sap River’s flow 
is reversed again to become a Mekong River tributary (Jacobs, 2002; Keskinen et al., 2008; Taylor, 
2010). 
The River’s functions differ between riparians looking at hydrological, economic and social aspects. 
In Cambodia, Laos and the Delta in southern Viet Nam — which are the Basin’s primary rural 
economies — it is a lifeline supporting millions of  fishers’ and farmers’ livelihoods. In landlocked 
Laos and China’s Yunnan province it is also used for transportation. Rural Lao and Cambodian 
communities further depend on the River’s aquatic organisms that are rich in protein and thus, 
“rural livelihoods depend on the broad diversity of  aquatic plants and animals and are closely 
entwined with the seasonal rhythm of  the river” (Taylor, 2010: 24). The seasonal flooding 
additionally support cultivation of  paddy rice (Keskinen et al., 2008). 
Most of  the River’s runoff  comes from the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). The Upper Mekong Basin 
(UMB) contributes with less than a fifth but is important for dry season flows and as a source for 
sediments. Upstream dams risk trapping sediments disturbing the downstream balance affecting 
agricultural and fisheries production. Dams in the UMB also risk impacting water levels in the dry 
season and the important Tonle Sap ecosystem (Keskinen et al., 2008; Kummu & Varis 2007; 
Kummu et al. 2008).  
While Laos and Viet Nam have shown prominent potential in developing large and small-scale 
hydropower, fossil fuel explorations continues in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Thailand. The Mekong’s 
potential as a source for energy is therefore of  great importance and has been emphasized by 
riparian governments (Vireak, 2014; Taylor, 2010). 
4.2 Transboundary Water Governance and National Interests 
Cooperation on the Mekong began with the Mekong Committee (MC) established in 1957 and 
pushed by the U.S. Bureau of  Reclamation that saw great potential for irrigation and hydropower in 
the region. Being a product of  the Cold War, China was excluded while also not being a UN 
member and Burma  was not interested (Keskinen et al., 2008). With the Khmer Rouge takeover in 5
Cambodia in 1975 political will for regional cooperation vanished. Remaining riparians — 
Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam — then formed the Interim Mekong Committee (IMC). The IMC 
 The name was officially changed to the Republic of  the Union of  Myanmar, short Myanmar, in 1989 by the military government to disaffiliate from 5
British colonial rule.
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was however very limited in its functions and cooperation on the Mekong became almost irrelevant 
for a decade (Keskinen et al., 2008).  
After having signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, the Cambodian government expressed a wish 
to recommence cooperation and after lengthy negotiations the four LMB riparians formed the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 (Keskinen et al., 2008) by signing the “Agreement on the 
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of  the Mekong River Basin” (Mekong River 
Commission, 1995). When the MRC Secretariat moved to Phnom Penh from Bangkok in 1998 it 
marked an important step for Cambodia’s path to stability and increased role in regional 
cooperation (Keskinen et al., 2008).  However, already in 1992 all six riparians had joined the 6
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
in 1996 the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched its “Mekong Basin 
Development Cooperation” . 7
The MRC, GMS and the ASEAN Mekong programs differ in a two main aspects. First, while the 
GMS and ASEAN programs include all riparians of  the Mekong River, MRC signatories were 
confined to the four of  the LMB (Keskinen et al., 2008; Hirsch et al., 2006). Second, the MRC see 
the river as a natural resource and focus on sustainable and comprehensive management. The GMS 
and ASEAN programs emphasize economic and infrastructure development and encourage 
cooperation within the basin (Keskinen et al., 2008; Mekong River Commission, 1995). The latter 
are also described as seeing the river not as a natural resource but as a symbol defining the region’s 
need for cooperation to achieve economic growth. It is however suggested that the different 
programs have started to near one another which raises questions of  overlaps (Keskinen et al., 2008; 
Hirsch et al., 2006). 
The MRC is perhaps the most central cooperation body in the region. Yet with only the four LMB 
riparians being signatories to the 1995 Agreement, domestic political reasons and competing 
national interests, its impact is argued to be limited (Backer, 2007; Keskinen et al., 2008). The 
exclusion of  China and Myanmar are “perhaps the biggest deficiency of  the MRC, seriously 
restricting comprehensive management of  the entire basin” lacking the prerequisite of  river basin 
management in considering the basin as a whole (Keskinen et al., 2008). It is also argued that the 
1995 Agreement lacks teeth in that national sovereignty is imperative rejecting any enforcement 
 At present there are two MRC secretariats, one in Phnom Penh and one in Vientiane. 6
 Cambodia joined ASEAN first in 1999 and in 2004 it joined WTO as the second least developed country to be admitted into the organization 7
through the full ordinary process (Keskinen et al., 2008; 99). 
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power of  the MRC. Hence, it is rather a coordinator than a controller and the 1995 Agreement has 
been described as weak allowing members to act as they choose (Hirsch, 2006; Keskinen et al., 
2008; Backer 2006). 
While much criticism is launched at the MRC and other programs they have played important roles 
as platforms for cooperation and sharing of  information between countries. More recently these 
regional efforts are challenged by an increase of  uni-, bi-, and multilateral development projects that 
do not take the watershed in its entirety into consideration and risk sidelining regional efforts. 
Arguably riparians’ prioritization of  national interests is subordinating regional cooperation 
(Keskinen et al., 2008: 90). 
4.3 Hydropower History and Status 
Economic growth has gone hand in hand with an increasing demand of  energy (about 8% annually) 
in the LMB. While average consumption of  energy is still low — around 2/3 of  average developing 
countries (920 kWh per capita per year) — it is estimated that 74 million people are still without 
household electricity and the demand is projected to increase (Taylor, 2010). 
The International Energy Agency predicts an 80% increase in energy demand in the region in the 
next 20 years (Figure 4.1) and the Mekong is not only seen as a source for energy but a path for 
mitigating climate change impacts and government revenue (Bakker, 1999; Keskinen et al., 2008; 
Nijhuis, 2015; Öjendal 2000; IUCN et al. 2007). In 2011 hydropower constituted 1,8% of  
Cambodia’s energy mix but 39% of  domestically installed capacity (Buysman et al., 2014; 
Electricity Authority of  Cambodia, 2013) 
Energy poverty is widespread and many rural areas depend on biomass for household needs. The 
region is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels. Imported energy constituted 21% of  
consumption in 2005 and fossil fuels amounted to 80% of  total fuels for electricity transformation. 
Oil dependency is estimated to increase in near decades and dependence on imports makes the 
region vulnerable to international fluctuations in prices and availability (Taylor, 2010). 
The total estimated potential for hydropower in the LMB is 30,000 MW with the last two decades 
having seen over 3,235 MW developed on tributaries and another 3,209 MW under construction. If  
the 134 planned projects would materialize the potential capacity would be exhausted. So far 
Thailand and Viet Nam have developed most of  its potential while Laos and Cambodia remain 
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largely undeveloped (Tyler, 2010). China currently has six existing dams on the Mekong mainstream 
amounting to 5,300 MW and nineteen proposed or under construction that would add another 
11,400 MW (Dong, 2015). Some estimate the capacity of  the UMB to 15,000 MW (Keskinen, 2008) 
while elsewhere Myanmar alone is referred to have a hydropower reserve capacity over 100,000 
MW and potential installed capacity of  46,000 MW (Khaing, 2015).  
Plans to developing hydropower on the Mekong mainstream have resurfaced in the LMB. If  
realized it would be the end of  a four-decade long development moratorium on the mainstream and 
the first mainstream dams in the LMB (Keskinen et al., 2008; Öjendal, 2012).  
4.3.1 Hydropower Regulation 
There are no international laws or standards with mandatory compliance in regard to hydropower. 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) have recommendations on how to follow best practices 
and ensure sustainability (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Another example is the International 
Hydropower Association’s (IHA) Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) 
(International Hydropower Association, 2015). The WCD is the product of  the World Bank and 
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International Union of  Conservation of  Nature. The IHA’s HSAP is seen by some as the 
hydropower industry's own assessment protocol (International Rivers, 2013).  
4.3.2 Hydropower and Climate Change 
Hydropower contributes to global warming by emitting methane (CH4), mainly through the 
decomposition of  organic matter in anoxic conditions. CH4 has a global warming potential 28 times 
that of  carbon dioxide (CO2) over one hundred years and 84 times over twenty years (Li & Lu, 
2012; Pachauri & Meyer, 2014). There is however uncertainty over how severe the emissions of  CH4 
from hydropower are and what conditions may increase or mitigate these. While some argue that 
tropical climates and large reservoirs contribute to higher emissions other argue that it has to do 
with the soil and land covered by the reservoir and the organisms living in it (Li & Lu, 2012; 
Kummu et al., 2010a & 2010b).  
4.3.3 Hydropower in Cambodia 
Cambodia’s first large-scale hydropower dam was the Chinese-built Kamchay hydropower plant 
located in Kampot operating at 193 MW when inaugurated in 2011. Other hydropower dams in 
Cambodia include the Kirirom I and III in Kampong Speu with operating capacity of  12 and 18 
MW respectively; the Lower Russei Chrum in Koh Kong with 338 MW with testing started in 2014; 
and, Stung Tatay and Stung Atay in Koh Kong with 246 and 120 MW respectively being partly 
operative and partly under construction (cf. Figure 4.2; Middleton, 2008; Open Development 
Cambodia, 2014a;  Rasmey, 2014).  
Feasibility studies are underway in Battambang and Pursat by Korean and Chinese companies and 
the northeastern provinces Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri have been opened up to hydropower 
exploration since the Sesan River Project was approved in 2011. Upcoming possible projects in 
Cambodia include the Lower Sesan 3, Lower Sesan 1/5, Lower Srepok 3 & 4 and Prek Liang 1 & 2. 
The Lower Sesan 2 hydropower project is predicted to cost over US$ 800 million and operate at 
400 MW with a 33,500 ha reservoir  and has been mounded by critique with regard to social, 8
environmental and economic aspects. In addition to the above tributary projects, the mainstream is 
considered for development with the proposed Sambor and Stung Treng dams (Middleton, 2008; 
Open Development Cambodia, 2014a;  PEC, 2008; Rasmey, 2014). 
Cambodia has no law on hydropower although there are laws on investment, electricity, land, forest, 
water resources and an EIA Law underway relevant for hydropower dam development. The Land 
Law, and the Constitution protect private ownership and state appropriation of  private land only 
 33,500 ha is equal to almost 47,000 soccer fields measuring 105x68 meters. 8
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after just and fair compensation in advance. However, full property rights are problematic for many 
Cambodians after the tumultuous years in the 1970s and many still await formal land titles, leaving 
people exposed to development projects without appropriate legal protection in land disputes (Baird, 
2015; Open Development Cambodia, 2014a; Middleton, 2008).   9
4.4 Summary 
The chapter has sought to illustrate the multi-faceted relevance of  the Mekong River in terms of  
social, economic and environmental aspects with a particular focus on Cambodia. It has highlighted 
limitations in regulatory frameworks, challenges for holistic river basin management and 
problematized the account of  hydropower as a clean energy source in terms of  greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 cf. the following laws of  the Kingdom of  Cambodia for details: Forestry Law (2002): Article 4; Land Law (2001): Articles 4, 5, 9
Chapter 4; Law on Investment (1994): Article 1; Law on Water Resource Management (2007): Article 12; Law on Environmental 
Protection and Natural Resource Management (1996): Article 6; Sub-decree on Environmental Impact Assessments Process (1999): 
Annex.
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5. Analysis of  Primary Data 
The chapter presents an analysis of  primary data obtained from interviews divided into four parts. 
Firstly section 5.1 attempts to justify the clustering of  actor positions in creating different story-lines 
whereafter each story-line is briefly introduced. Sections 5.2-5.4 present each cluster of  actors that 
form a story-line one by one. Each story-line is structured using the three aspects in Munasinghe’s 
(1993) sustainable development triangle (cf. section 3.1). A rotating order of  the aspects was found to 
most fittingly to depict each story-line. While each quote can only epitomize the individual 
respondent they should in this presentation be seen as part of  reproducing a story-line’s discursive 
closure as a whole. 
5.1 Narratives of  Meaning 
As social action derives from a combination of  actors’ agency within enabling and simultaneously 
constraining social structures, actors are found to operate in the same lacuna as story-lines, i.e. a 
space between epistemes and individual construction. As described earlier, actors adhere to story-lines 
because its elements’ present a cognitive or discursive coherence suggesting they are complementary. 
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This discursive affinity, in the interface of  agency and structure, guided the clustering of  positions 
representing discovered story-lines (cf. 3.2.3 Discourse-coalitions). 
Three essential story-lines were discovered during the course of  the project. Two (Story-lines 1 and 
3) can be characterized as extremes in that they follow an (close to) all-or-nothing narrative. Another 
(Story-line 2), occupy a relative intermediate position arguing “[I]t’s not a question of  hydropower 
or not hydropower” which also is the heading of  section 5.2 presenting that story-line. In the same 
fashion the headings for Story-line 1 — “Hydropower will kill the Mekong!” — and Story-line 3 — 
“We need to develop, you must understand!” — aim to illustrate their narratives through which 
discursive closure is achieved.  
5.2 Story-line 1: “Hydropower will kill the Mekong!” 
5.2.1 Economic Aspects 
The story-line starts with an expression of  skepticism to the economic aspects of  hydropower 
development. The reluctance is three-fold including disbelief  in projects’ ability to generate their 
calculated capacity; riparian influence; and, questioning global development trends. One 
respondent used the ongoing construction of  the Lower Sesan 2 hydropower project in Cambodia 
as an example of  the first aspect. 
“[It] is a 400 MW project, the firm capacity of  this project is only a 100 MW. /…/ And we actually don’t even believe it’s going 
to be 100 MW, this is just what the EIA report says.” (Interview 13) 
The respondent went on saying that,  
“ADB had done studies before and said it didn’t make economic sense to build a project there because it’s just a complete 
flatland.” (Interview 13) 
The same respondent sees the reason to hydropower projects continued development in Cambodia 
being twofold. The statement implies that current trends are not a result of  the country’s need but 
an effect of  development in other countries and expansionist policies of  an upstream riparian. 
“… part is because they seen it from their neighbors, part is because you have these hydropower companies, especially from 
China, where they have dammed up the country and now they are seeking to export and look for new opportunities.” (Interview 
13) 
The respondent strongly questioned the trend seen in Cambodia and the need for new projects, not 
only because they carry negative impacts but also expressed a critical stance towards the sincerity of  
projected electricity demand.  
“None of  this makes sense. And I don’t think they could actually consume all the electricity from these projects in the first place. 
And so they will have to export some of  it.” (Interview 13)  
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Consecutively, another respondent takes the argument a step farther questioning development 
trends more generally implying more is not always better and definitely not sustainable. 
“… that [increasing] power demand brings us to a different question, just, the question of  sustainable development in general. 
Where are we going as you know as a human race on this planet with this constant demand for more and more and 
more.” (Interview 16) 
5.2.2 Environmental Aspects 
Using a dramatic phrasing one respondent expressed a wide ecological concern to the current trend 
of  hydropower development saying that, 
“… dams are proving to be, in most cases, the final nail in the coffin for Cambodia’s natural resources.” (Interview 37) 
Mentioning natural resources the respondent here refers to a decade long critique of  what is seen as 
mis-management of  Cambodia’s natural resources pertaining to, in particular, deforestation, sand 
dredging and depletion of  soils [cf. e.g. Global Witness, 2007 & 2009].  
Stemming from the above, hydropower is not seen as a clean or green source for energy but rather 
an aggravating factor to existing development challenges. Referring to the topography of  Cambodia 
often necessitating large reservoirs, which requires additional deforestation that in turn become a 
source for methane emissions one respondent said that, 
“… in Cambodia it is a myth to say that a lot of  the hydropower dams are clean energy.” (Interview 13)  
Big reservoirs are described as a potent source for methane emissions, which lead to the conclusion 
that hydropower is contributing to climate change and thereby should not, and cannot be seen as a 
renewable or green energy source. In concert, a history of  hydroelectric projects not reaching 
sufficient capacity when electricity is needed the most during the dry season was highlighted. One 
respondent referred to ongoing construction of  coal fired power plants in Cambodia to offset the 
lacking dry season capacity of  hydropower.  
“So they are going in both directions, building coal fired and hydro. Now people consume electricity the most during the dry 
season because it’s the hottest, and that’s exactly when you don’t have water, so for hydropower inside Cambodia doesn’t make a 
lot of  sense.” (Interview 13)  
In combination with hydropower being seen as a source for greenhouse gas emissions and thus 
contributing to climate change, its impacts on natural flows and annual fluctuations of  the River are 
seen as severe.  
“The fluctuations are what’s so important for the vitality of  the river.” (Interview 13) 
“Chinese dams have blocked sediment flows by 50 percent already and they have also changed the hydrological cycle.” (Interview 
13) 
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The River’s and riverine ecosystems are described to be in danger with subsequent impacts to 
livelihoods build around aquatic resources provided by the River, e.g. rain-fed agriculture and 
dependence on annual floods. An element of  distrust in engineering-solutions is present. One 
respondent highlighted it as a serious food security issue with impacts beyond the environmental, 
another sarcastically expressed confidence in fish ladders.  
“If  you get rid of  the fish is there enough livelihood? And there is not. /…/ You don’t have enough water resources or land 
resources to try to compensate for the amount of  livestock that you will require.” (Interview 13) 
“[Even] if  you were to really boost up each of  the countries potential in aquaculture /…/ the strategic environmental assessment 
said they can only possibly replace about 10 percent of  lost fisheries.” (Interview 13) 
“I saw a fish ladder, I think it was a kilometer long and they had to do a thousand jumps.” (Interview 8, Respondent A) 
5.2.3 Social Aspects 
Turning to social aspect there is a repeated critique against project proponents not implementing 
best practices and international recommendations. One respondent said, “we haven’t seen any 
projects really adhere to all of  the World Commission on Dams standards yet” (Interview 13). The 
respondent went on arguing the reason was “some of  the governments thought the WCD was too 
difficult and didn’t want to follow it so the International Hydropower Association decided to create 
their own standards” (Interview 13).  
Implied here is a perceived unwillingness from project proponents to carry out hydropower projects 
in ways that will have the least possible impacts to the environment and affected communities. 
Continuing in regard to the IHA protocol — the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
(HSAP) — the element of  critique extends to its structure where a general lack of  regulation 
necessitating compliance is seen to be a central problem.  One respondent said, 
“… [even] if  every villager was against it, they still could build it and receive a pretty good score.” (Interview 13) 
“It’s all just basically standards or principles that, there is no necessity of  compliance or anything like that.” (Interview 13) 
As such the HSAP is characterized as a tool that will allow any project to go ahead, a way to 
greenwash hydropower projects by the industry. There is a frustration present in this regard when 
another respondent similarly argued that even though laws and best practices exist they are not 
followed. 
“There are a lot of  good laws out there, but the problem is that they are just on paper, they are not being implemented because of  
the political structure, the corruption, the systematic you know, abuse of  power by the power elites.” (Interview 16) 
This line of  argument carries a belief  that project proponents have little regard for direct and long-
term impacts and simply want to apply tools that will give the project a green Potemkin-dress. 
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Another respondent continued by stating that actors have different meanings of  who the people are 
that constitute the country and are eligible to benefits of  hydropower projects.  
“We can see people speak different language. The Government they say: ‘I develop hydropower for our country and for the 
income for the people’. But who are really our people? Indigenous people, women, children? They are suffer by development and 
no one is answer to this up till now.” (Interview 18) 
Different meanings and a disbelief  in existing practices for consulting and compensating affected 
communities are seen to be further exacerbated by inadequate mechanisms for sharing information. 
On the latter one respondent referred to Vietnamese hydropower development and impacts in 
Cambodia in the 1990s. 
“When dams were first built on the Sesan River the villagers were praying to the gods, they thought they had done something 
wrong, they didn’t understand there were dams upstream. /…/ [And when] the first Ya Li Falls [dam] broke in 1996 /…/ [and] 
caused a lot of  flooding and people died in Cambodia, and that's when they started to sacrifice their animals and stuff  to the gods 
then, I don’t think it was until 2000 that they learned that there were dams upstream, and they never received 
compensation.” (Interview 13) 
Here, communities are seen to be victims of  developments in neighboring countries too. Left out not 
only from the decision-making processes but likewise misrepresented and disregarded by their own 
government for not receiving timely and adequate explanations to what is happening.  
Critique also pertains to details of  how compensation is calculated. This is described as simplistic 
approaches to development and implementation of  measurement indicators of  acceptable 
livelihood targets. Taking the Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos as an example — a project lauded as 
sustainable by developers and financiers — concerns are raised to what are considered best practices 
when these are adapted by other countries. One respondent illustrated this through the weakness in 
too narrowly defined income targets of  what is sustainable. 
“I can't remember the rates, but they had set livelihood targets, income targets basically that each villager should receive this 
much money at this point [in time and] then they are fine. But what’s happened in is, because the natural resources have declined 
people have had to go into logging around the plateau, so they are logging out the plateau, so their income is up at the level /…/ 
[they] said but it is not sustainable because obviously the plateau is disappearing, and they have been pushed into this you 
know.” (Interview 13) 
This line of  critique is continued by another respondent who sees a failure in considering impacts 
beyond the directly impacted areas, particularly in terms of  fisheries and other riverine resources 
and livelihoods. 
“If  you just focus on like a community in the vicinity and not on the sixty-million people in the region that are going to be 
affected of  course then it is going to look like a great project.” (Interview 16) 
In addition to emphasizing weak regulatory institutional frameworks and too narrow impact 
assessments, lacking benefit sharing mechanisms is a central element in reproducing hydropower as 
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atrocious. While one respondent said that projects “need to be more consider how much benefit for 
local people” (Interview 18) another was more blunt arguing that affected communities rarely see 
any benefits from projects “since all the electricity is going to Thailand to you know to power big 
malls in Bangkok” (Interview 16). Yet another respondent, reiterating the need for consultation and 
bottom-up community-led development, stated that “what is fair need to talk what is fair 
mean” (Interview 18). Here the respondent highlights not only the need for deliberations but 
emphasizes that the meaning of  fair compensation might shift between different communities, 
places and cultures. Therefore, no generic solution or mechanism for compensation of  lost 
livelihoods is likely to suffice. 
Community-led development is a fundament for Story-line 1, even if  it does not result in the most 
efficient or effective strategies, technological solutions or holistic understanding and implementation 
of  development projects. Nevertheless, the Story-line respondents express a unified belief  that 
sustainable development can only be realized when it is the result of  the wills, and driven by the ides 
of  the grassroots. 
“Sustainable development to me is first of  all the development where the communities actually decide what their futures are going 
to be, they have to be consulted in every step of  the way /…/ it has to come from the grassroots.” (Interview 16) 
“… local people need to have a say in what they want for their futures and that has to be /…/ the bottom of  it.” (Interview 13) 
“I’m not saying that the communities will always have the best solutions but nevertheless they need to be consulted and they have 
to have a voice in all of  these decisions and they are just not” (Interview 16)  
On respondent expressed the core of  the problem being the case that ongoing development does not 
give the grassroots enough attention. As a result any efforts to consult and compensate communities 
affected are put into questioning for their efficiency and effectiveness implying that local 
communities only experience negative impacts and rarely see any benefits.  
“…the underlying problem of  all these [hydropower] projects /…/ is that nobody is asking people on the ground /…/ [and they 
are] displacing whole cultures, cutting them off  their land, cutting them off  their traditional way of  life you know and without 
consulting them, without you know proper compensation.” (Interview 16) 
5.2.4 The Alternative 
Solar power and varying definitions of  small-scale hydropower  were raised as the favored 10
alternative. However, this was conditioned by being done through a decentralized approach of  
community managed energy transformation. 
“[Solar] won’t cut the fish supply, you know people can /…/ continue /…/ living off  fish, fishing for food for their livelihoods, 
you know living in an environment that isn’t polluted practicing their cultural way of  life if  they chose to do that.” (Interview 16) 
 The definition of  small-scale hydropower among respondents varied from between 1 and 2 MW to 10 and 20 MW.10
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“You can look at the energy solution, like solar energy or small scale hydropower as I mention[ed], it will avoid the harm or the 
impact. That is why the big scale can not avoid.” (Interview 17) 
“10 MW [hydropower plants] may be less impact, still impact but slightly impact and managed by local people.” (Interview 18) 
5.2.5 Discursive closure 
As such, the statement “Hydropower will kill the Mekong” (Interview 2), most directly and in the 
context it was uttered, refer to a changed natural flow of  the Mekong, perhaps even ceased, that will 
place the threatened Irrawaddy Dolphin, and numerous fish and other species in lethal jeopardy. 
In the next instance the statement refers to the people directly dependent on the River, riverine 
ecosystems and natural fluctuations for their livelihoods and ultimately their survival. It says that this 
group of  people are not only the ones who will be most affected, they are also in a situation where 
they cannot afford, or do not wish to replace river-based fisheries with aquaculture, nor pumping 
water into their paddy-rice fields instead of  relying on the annual flood and seasonal rains. They are 
the victims of  a development juggernaut. The statement also signifies that this group is those who 
constitute the people, the grassroots and the communities representing the heart of  Cambodia’s cultural and 
historic identity. Hence, the Story-line goes that it is not only the flow of  water and the ecological 
diversity that are under threat. Identities shaped through livelihoods, cultures and traditions are 
dying parts of  the Mekong. 
5.3 Story-line 2: “It’s not a question of  hydropower or not hydropower” 
First, situated in-between the two extremes, expressions of  a perceived polarization was reoccurring 
in Story-line 2 painting a picture of  the difficulties to hold an intermediary position. This was most 
eloquently stated by on respondent in the two quotes below.  
“I increasingly hear from both sides that there is a need to go into the middle. But there is a real fear of  going into the middle 
because you expose yourself  for criticism from both sides. /…/ There’s no space in the middle, it’s impossible to be in the 
middle.” (Interview 24) 
5.3.1 Social Aspects 
A central element to sustainable development in Story-line 2 is information sharing and community 
participation in “every step of  development” (Interview 8, Respondent C). Referring to project 
proponents’ haste in getting projects to go ahead and how this limits community participation and 
taking part of  information the respondent continued,  
“… it’s very quick and quick and information not reach to the community.” (Interview 8, Respondent C) 
Information is in this aspect essential because the countries in the Lower Mekong Basin are “the 
four world records in terms of  fish consumption” (Interview 21) and thus crucial to food security. 
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Timely and appropriate information is seen necessary to allow for communities to be consulted, to 
adapt and given a chance to replace lost fish-protein. 
Another element pertains to sharing the benefits of  projects. Two respondents focused on the (lack 
of) electrification of  rural areas close to a hydroelectric plant but not receiving any of  the benefits.  
”… [it is] not sustain[able] /…/ they want to produce electricity for the community around, but most of  them cannot get 
electricity. What is sustainable [about that]?” (Interview 25, Respondent B) 
“… the community told [me] that the company told them that they will get electricity for free for the impacted community, but 
now they pay still higher than Phnom Penh City and that is one problem.” (Interview 25, Respondent B)  
“… the argument [of  increasing energy demand] would work if  we see a pattern of  the benefits coming back into the country /
…/ but the model throughout the greater Mekong is that they are selling it on. So actually if  Cambodia does generate its 
electricity, one would want to see in all the contracts some little bit that says, well some of  it will go into you know Ratanakiri, 
rather than actually it’s all just going across the border.” (Interview 8, Respondent D) 
Rural and indigenous communities’ difficulties to adapt to a new situation after resettlement is 
further a central issue. Long-term livelihood restoration programs going beyond monetary 
compensation were seen necessary. 
“[It] is not a big deal for the people in the city but is really completely biggest issue for the indigenous people [and] for ethnic 
groups because they [depend on] the forest and water [and] soil.” (Interview 7) 
“[There has to be] livelihood restoration program[s] after the dam for I mean years and years and years, to ensure that their 
livelihood is better.” (Interview 25, Respondent A) 
Hence, while expressing an acceptance for some hydropower differences between rural and urban 
challenges in development processes are acknowledged. One respondent argued that there are 
plenty of  good practices to follow but that stronger enforcement mechanisms are required. 
“[Cambodia] need energy, [energy] independence maybe not, but at least lower energy dependency /…/ on fossil fuels. But it 
can not be at the expense on the food security.” (Interview 21) 
“… there are plenty of  good practice to follow, the evidence is that governments don’t. Governments sign an agreement with a 
private company and the private company is left to do it /…/ so it’s the accountability of  the private companies and lack of  
monitoring or holding private company to account [that is the problem].” (Interview 8, Respondent D) 
5.3.2 Economic Aspects 
On economic aspects one respondent argued that hydroelectricity will allow country to develop in 
numerous aspects but precaution and careful assessments must remain central to minimize impacts 
in the long term.  
“We need electricity and when you have electricity you can build up from that and do many other things. Of  course we need 
it.” (Interview 5, Respondent A)  
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“… those hydropower dam development plan[s] need [to be] carefully study to see, to measure the impact and also maximize the 
benefit from that.” (Interview 5, Respondent B) 
Here a criticism against Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes that govern many hydroelectric 
projects in Cambodia arose. The argument implies that the desire for foreign investment allows 
corruptive practices and outrival the need to implement stricter regulations.  
“Those build and operate deals in Cambodia are terrible, it’s really too much to the advantage of  the developer.” (Interview 21) 
“[BOT is a way to] privatize benefits and externalize all the costs to the wider society.” (Interview 14, Respondent A) 
“In places like Lao or Cambodia or Myanmar, governments aren’t that strong and when you have four billion dollar projects with 
banks behind it, who is going to say not to that. These countries are in need of  foreign direct investment, so they don’t want to put 
in place strict regulations that are going to hurt, or be perceived to hurt investors.” (Interview 14, Respondent A) 
“Even the hydropower consultants that work on these projects, apparently when they are assessing a project to say whether they 
are going ahead with it they expect to lose 10 to 15 percent, and apparently that's an industry thing that they expect.” (Interview 
8, Respondent D) 
Following the institutional critique above, one respondent expressed concerns to not having seen any 
plans or agreements on what happens after the concession period in terms of  what kind of  
infrastructure the developer is to hand over.  
“… when those contracts after 40 years will be over it is the government that will have to pick up the pieces, and most of  those 
dams will be in such a state in terms of  sediment filling of  the reservoir [and] in terms of  maintenance and so forth, that it’s 
actually going to cost them to maintain those infrastructure instead of  benefiting them.” (Interview 21) 
The respondent continued by questioning the strong focus on domestic energy transformation for 
the often cited reason of  bringing cheap electricity to Cambodia. 
“… they will be dependent on their neighbors for electricity supply forever. I mean there is no way they can avoid that, and why 
should they avoid it? If  hydropower develops in Laos and in Vietnam, if  Thailand has… /…/ it will, remain for a very long time 
cheaper to import electricity than to produce it in Cambodia, that’s very clear.” (Interview 21)  
5.3.3 Environmental Aspects 
In the environmental category hydropower’s potential to “contribute to reduce the climate 
change” (Interview 5, Respondent A) was carefully brought up highlighting that uncertainties 
remain. While seeing an element of  environmental benefits, long-term biodiversity impacts must be 
carefully considered emphasizing the importance of  design and location of  hydroelectric plants. 
“People may say that the hydropower development also good for the climate change as well with small dam but to me it is very 
uncertainty about that.” (Interview 22) 
“In some cases they find that some of  these hydropower plants that was built to replace coal plants, or as an alternative to coal 
plants, are actually not much better because of  the methane it is giving off.” (Interview 14, Respondent A) 
“It is not a problem of  hydropower, it is how it being done /…/ design, location, strategy, that is where the problem 
is.” (Interview 21) 
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The need to act out of  precaution in development was a central theme. One respondent referred to 
the ecological and biological richness in the Mekong as “mind-boggling” (Interview 21) pointing out 
the remaining amount of  unknowns about the Mekong.  
“… there is actually still a hell of  a lot of  unknowns about how this ecosystem functions. So in correlation to that any 
development you do without knowing all the consequences on the system is a problem.” (Interview 21) 
Another respondent focused on the diversity of  fish species and issues of  engineering solutions to 
different migration patterns. 
“… [the] diversity [of  fish species] is very high so it [is] hard to make the pass-way to for all those fish to pass.” (Interview 22) 
Specifically speaking on the proposed Sambor mainstream dam in Cambodia respondents expressed 
strong concerns of  estimated environmental impacts while recognizing favorable economic, energy 
and geographical aspects of  the project.  
“… still [it is] a very small fraction of  the region’s energy mix /…/ like 10 percent /…/ but with huge environmental 
consequences.” (Interview 14, Respondent A)  
“… [it would] block the last free flowing water in the Mekong, and that the consequences on fisheries migration will be horrible, 
because it also going stop also a lot of  the reversal of  the flow in the Tonle Sap. /…/ [But] it is a two gigawatt dam so for 
Cambodia to give up on such an amount of  power [is unlikely] /…/ and the central position makes it also more 
interesting.” (Interview 21) 
A central element of  the environmental aspect here is recognition of  some changes that have 
already occurred. Therefore, in line with a belief  in the right to develop, focus ought to be on what 
can be done to minimize impacts from hydropower projects rather than obstruct any proposal.  
“… it’s a bit of  principle, if  you can’t beat them, join them /…/ there is a need in a place with such a young population for 
development to take place. I mean you can’t keep 75 percent of  the population below poverty levels and depending on subsistence 
agriculture, I’m sorry nowhere in the world is that [going to] happen. And it is unfair even to do that. So you need to accompany 
the process in the most positive, the least damaging way possible.” (Interview 21) 
5.3.4 The Alternative 
Hydropower is seen as a far from perfectly clean energy due to negative impacts and uncertainties in 
all three aspects. It is however recognized that any energy solution comes with negative effects.  
“… clean energy, hydropower, it isn’t. There is not such a thing as clean energy, it doesn’t exist so far, we haven’t found. /…/ You 
cannot oppose the dams, for example, for the sake of  opposing the dams because they do damages to the natural resources. 
Because the alternative is indeed fossil fuel or expensive electricity which will anyway be detrimental in the long term.” (Interview 
21)  
“… we have to disband this notion that if  you do solar, if  you do wind or if  you do hydropower these are non-polluting or no 
environmental footprint, that is not true. /…/ … [for example,] solar is extremely polluting for the elements in the batteries and 
the panels.” (Interview 21) 
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Hence, no silver-bullet alternative is suggested but rather a struggle to ensure that the hydropower 
that is build is done in an appropriate place, with least damaging design and together with local 
communities. One respondent also wished to see more European developers engage the region in 
order to see what their corporate social responsibility and statutory environmental criteria could 
achieve (Interview 8, Respondent B; Interview 21).  
5.3.5 Discursive closure 
As such, the description of  the problem that “It’s not a question of  hydropower or not 
hydropower” (Interview 14, Respondent A) refers to the perceived polarization of  the debate and a 
notion that many projects will happen regardless other interventions.  
The statement also includes a bifold notion of  the effects of  hydropower. While negative impacts 
pertaining to all three aspects are recognized, there is an acknowledgement of  Cambodia’s right to 
develop — and the need for electricity in that process — with a particular emphasis of  the rights of  
the young population and their futures. The story-line holds a belief  in working with established 
institutions and changing the system from within rather than challenging it as a whole.  
Hence, the story-line goes that categorically dismissing hydropower will not lead to the best results. 
Instead focus ought to be on what can be done to make the best out of  the situation that is 
happening regardless of  ideal preferences. 
5.4 Story-line 3: “We need to develop, you must understand!” 
5.4.1 Environmental Aspects 
While concerns were raised to the sustenance of  river flows, deforestation and sediment impacts, it 
was not portrayed as an obstacle to development but factors that necessitate persuading assessments 
on how and that to proceed. Studies are described as a way to approve a project rather than to 
evaluate its feasibility.  
“… if  they have a lot of  reservoir I am afraid of  biodiversity and ecosystems there /…/ more deforestations and especially the 
sediment deposition. /…/… scientific study should be carefully conducted to prove, to show that that area, that the dam will have 
no severe impact on the ecosystem and environment.” (Interview 23) 
There was an expressed a belief  in technical and engineering solutions to environmental issues such 
as fish migration, and hydropower is viewed to come with social rewards through its “benefit[s] to 
reduce poverty” (Interview 29). Some environmental impacts are seen as an acceptable part of  
hydropower projects as it will allow improvements in other areas.  
#  of  #32 51
Johannes Nilsson CHAPTER FIVE | ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY DATA
“We try to develop our country, cannot keep as it is and will impact environment. /…/ With development we can get income, 
some impact, but more income. /…/ New technology and methodology [will result in development] with less impact [and] 
benefit for the whole country and the local.” (Interview 27) 
Climate change is brought up as an element justifying hydroelectric projects. The argument states 
that an elevated severity of  unpredictable rain patterns call for flood and water release management, 
which will mitigate climate change impacts and enhance agricultural productivity in the dry season. 
Climate change, perceived as an external factor, is emphasized as a central reason for hydropower 
development making it something that has to be done as there is no choice in a changing climate.  
“Because now in Southeast Asia, especially in Mekong region, [we experience] climate change, a lot of  change in terms of  rain 
patterns. We have two seasons, dry and wet, but delay, sometime delay, the rain delay and the dry season extend more day[s]. /
…/ … somewhere no, never much rain but coming more raining and flood coming and the area [where] often raining [before] 
but [now] no more raining so it is problem, it is climate change.” (Interview 28) 
“… so you develop this hydropower ok, flood control ok, for climate change, we keep water, because if  not dam the water will 
flow out to the sea you know.” (Interview 28)  
“… it [is] not really about the [hydropower] dam but about climate change /…/ [it is an] external factor.” (Interview 28) 
The reservoir is also seen to have benefits, one respondent said that “before reservoir no fish, after a 
lot of  fish [in the reservoir] /…/ [and] the reservoir can be the recharge for 
groundwater” (Interview 27). The respondent went on arguing that, so far, no significant problems 
had been encountered as a result of  hydropower projects in Cambodia. Acknowledging the 
importance of  flow quantity the respondent referred to it in its capacity in retaining its quality. 
“Pollution from the factory [and agricultural fertilizers] released in river, if  flow not enough then quality decrease. If  flow enough 
quality is ok and [fish] living in the river can still alive.” (Interview 27) 
Turning to development projects upstream from Cambodia an alternative interpretation is 
demonstrated to impacts from hydropower and the risk of  downstream impacts.  
“Tonle Sap is the system of  the Mekong, if  something change in the Mekong also change in the Tonle Sap. If  something change 
in the Tonle Sap also change in the downstream the Mekong Delta. So it is very very linked system so [in regard to] Xiabury Lao 
said that not important for Cambodia but no no [can not] say like that, it is important for the whole system.” (Interview 28) 
“Vietnam develop more, so impact to /…/ water flow [and] also water quality so change everything, you know natural 
resource[s] not only fishery, different livelihoods [of] the people and biodiversity in the river [have been affected].” (Interview 28) 
The contended state of  the hydropower debate in Cambodia is acknowledged and argue to be a 
result of  a public scare from experiences of  destructive examples in neighboring countries in the 
past. The collapse of  the Ya Li Falls dam is an example used as a primer directing the burden to 
Viet Nam.  
“You can see the issues happenings in the Sesan River where Ya Li Falls dam [in Vietnam] was constructed and it provided a lot 
of  negative impacts on rivers. People reported that the fish degradations decrease a lot and also the flow change especially up and 
down flows in the dry seasons, also /…/ impact on biodiversity and ecosystems.” (Interview 23) 
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“… people [are] afraid that the fish migrations will be /…/ suffering /…/ [that it is] the main driver for fish degradation, fish 
decrease in the Lower Sesan. People told me that now you can not even find the bigger fish because that more dam constructions 
provide some negative impacts to that river.” (Interview 23) 
5.4.2 Social Aspects  
While recognizing that people are scared, hydropower is seen as a “very important source of  
energies for Cambodia” (Interview 23) and challenges to make it sustainable pertains to “how to 
make the public accepts it [so we can have] development without any protest” (Interview 23). 
Negative impacts are admitted to be a possibility, and if  they occur emphasis is put on managing 
perceptions of  the new situation. One respondent’s statement illustrates this by talking on the topic 
of  what fair compensation mean in practice.  
“… simply mean that I win and you win. I mean when I lose fishing jobs what should I do next, I should be trained, I should be 
supported like financially and I should be provided trainings, technical training for survival for find new jobs how to help them 
survive in other area that they have no experience [of] before.” (Interview 23) 
To achieve this a focus is on settling compensation and resettlements through existing institutional 
frameworks to ensure projects’ swift and painless go-ahead. It is also argued that Cambodia to date 
does not have sufficient experience and the only way to gain expertise is to keep implementing 
projects.  
“Good consultation with stakeholders and policy[-makers] can make fast development. [We] need EIA and resettlement and 
compensation plan[s] to make development smoothly and share the benefits to community.” (Interview 27)  
“Our experience [is] not enough, not enough experience but we have to learn.” (Interview 28) 
To Story-line 3 sustainable development is characterized through a modernistic lens where it is 
argued that subsistence agriculture and fishery as traditional ways of  making a living should be 
replaced by livelihoods that fit the process of  a modernizing Cambodia. The statement below 
involves a strong notion to move away from an agricultural based economy.  
“We need to get people out of  traditional livelihood[s], development can be the motivation to move on /…/ they need to try to 
find the job for the best life when not cultivate rice, cannot just relax.” (Interview 27) 
5.4.3 Economic Aspects 
Arguing for the need of  continued investments in Cambodia one respondent questioned “why no 
other country [than China] want to invest” (Interview 29). The statement was framed in a way 
lending itself  to at least two possible interpretations. The first, and most direct interpretation, is that 
other countries are very welcome to invest and contribute to the Cambodia’s development but for 
some reason chose not to. The second is that the Chinese and Cambodian governments have a 
special bond and that the Chinese model is favored to the western conditionality approach. Both 
possible interpretations were further illustrated when the respondent continued. 
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“[There is] no risk with China hydropower investment, [because the] government have the good cooperation and support, no 
risk.” (Interview 29) 
The need for hydropower from an economic point of  view was seen as given. The same respondent 
argued, in reference to import and export of  electricity, that Cambodia “need to have the exchange 
of  power in the lower Mekong Basin /…/ [and] sell excess back to them” (Interview 29), referring 
to other riparians. Here the need to transform more energy to electricity than need for domestic 
consumption is highlighted through, and justified by, the need for generating revenue that will feed 
into other development efforts. Domestic energy transformation was seen as a pathway to cheaper 
electricity that will support people in their daily lives and attract more foreign investment.  
“Now the government try to reduce the price of  electricity, it is good you know, to promote investment /…/ an important aspect 
of  [hydropower development] /…/ if  [we have] cheap electricity, people can use everything to support [a modern] 
lifestyle.” (Interview 28) 
Another element of  the economic aspect is depicted in arguments pertaining to decisions on how to 
determine a project’s go ahead. Here one respondent suggested that the value from constructing a 
hydroelectric plant should be compared to the value of  other possible uses of  the area and in turn 
constitute the basis for decision. It was further argued that leaving an area untouched does not 
equate sustainability. Successful and sustainable development is seen as that which generate 
economically prosperous societies, which in turn will lead to public acceptance.  
“… what can we get from forest if  here for 1 year. If  develop hydropower what we get for 1 year in money, we need to 
compare.” (Interview 27) 
“… it does not mean sustainable you do nothings in that area without anythings, you should develop with more strategies to make 
that area more prosperous that the public accept that development.” (Interview 23) 
While taking a position where economic development have the potential to lead sustainable paths in 
other areas it was recognized that “tradeoffs must be longer[-term] not only shorter[-
term]” (Interview 28). This was given further attention when the respondent took outset in 
economic development’s capacity in leading positive results in other sectors. 
“We have to develop [our economy] but use the result of  [economic] development to support social, economic and 
environment[al aspects] also, how to make better civilization of  the people, of  the country.” (Interview 28) 
“… you can have canal or divert water [through] irrigation system[s] to help people. Pumping [water], if  you have electricity you 
can pump and pump to support people[’s livelihoods]. So civilization you know, make not only their lives [better] but [support] 
education, transportation, you know market system and investment there [to] promote ecotourism something like that you know, 
so we have to do every sector together.” (Interview 28) 
Referring to social and environmental impacts from hydropower projects one respondent 
acknowledged that “sometime money from development cannot solve the problem” (Interview 27). 
However, the respondent continued by saying that a good way to assess a project's feasibility is to 
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“convert all to money and compare if  or not develop” (Interview 27).  In a similar fashion another 
respondent expressed a view of  economic value comparison to determine a whether or not a project 
should be built.  
“If  [the] benefit[s are] bigger than loss, [it is] ok, [but] if  [the] loss[es are] bigger than [the] benefit[s], no.” (Interview 29) 
5.4.4 Justifying the Hydropower Alternative  
Hydropower is justified through a firm belief  that benefits are greater than the negative impacts it 
comes with. Impacts are seen as manageable through policies and technical solutions. Economic 
growth in neighboring countries are seen to necessitate tapping the Mekong on hydropower also in 
Cambodia; or they will fall behind. One respondent referred to Laos arguing it is Cambodia’s turn 
now, “Lao before not developed but now GDP increase, Cambodia need too” (Interview 27). 
Another compared Cambodia’s use of  the Mekong to that of  Viet Nam emphasizing a potential 
great loss relative other riparians if  the Mekong was left untouched. 
“You know Vietnam use 99 percent of  water in the Mekong, Vietnam use, but Cambodia nothing. You can see Cambodia we 
never get water from the Mekong, but water from the rain of  course, but from the Mekong we don’t, so flow out. 100 years ago 
flow out so no any benefit from the Mekong. /…/ No any infrastructure development yet.” (Interview 28) 
“We got nothing from the Mekong [before], [now] we do something. But the mainstream Cambodia maybe not now, in the future 
[perhaps], if  our social economic grow[th] you know next 50 year, if  we are strong like in Europe [we can also have] cascade dam 
everywhere /…/ [they can] because they are strong, strong economic.” (Interview 28) 
Finally, referring to tumultuous past decades one respondent saw ongoing development as a “[g]ood 
process, now [we] can realize, before just [a] dream” (Interview 29).  
5.4.5 Discursive closure 
As such, the statement “We need to develop you must understand!” (Interview 27) focus, most 
directly on Cambodia’s status as an LDC with remaining poverty, energy poverty, lacking 
infrastructure and humble living standards that necessitates development throughout the country 
and different sectors. It implies a right to develop in what is perceived as a western way where 
Cambodia and Cambodians in the future are allowed to enjoy the social and economic living 
standards of  for example Sweden.  
The statement also carries a notion that environmental and social impacts as can be manageable. 
First, environmental impacts from hydropower are possible to deal with by applying new 
technological and engineering solutions. Secondly, social impacts are seen as a challenge of  
implementing existing and new policies based on scientific studies that will provide people with 
proof  of  this being the right way forward.  
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Hence, the story-line carries sustainable development with an emphasis on progress. Economic 
development is the priority, a need and a right to avoid stagnation, and will allow solving the 
challenges that emerge though the process itself.  
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6. Concluding Discussion 
As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, hydropower is a complex issue that attract 
attention from numerous actors from different societal sectors and one which spans over a multitude 
of  thematic, disciplinary and discursive elements. The thesis’ attempt to illustrate this was through a 
clustering of  elements according to the three pillars, or aspects of  sustainable development. Just as 
the aspects are nested together, feeding of  and into each other and as such inseparable, the 
discursive elements and the actors are too.  
Thematically the discursive elements of  hydropower include the need for domestic electricity and 
hydroelectric plants’ part in that play; natural resource management; topographic and geographic 
appraisals; quality and quantity of  river flow and sediment transportation; cultural practices and 
traditional ways of  life; riverine livelihoods; fish migration; biodiversity; the role of  research and 
assessments; the constitution of  consultations, compensation and resettlement mechanisms; foreign 
direct investment; poverty alleviation; regulatory frameworks; democratic representation; 
information sharing; corruption; centralized and decentralized development; democratic decision-
making; and, climate change, to name a few. 
While most, yet not all, of  these discursive elements are included in each of  the story-lines they are 
given different meanings so to resonate with the whole story-line and contribute to a discursive 
closure. As set out in Chapter 3, discursive closure is facilitated through a story-line’s three functions, 
i.e. to facilitate the reduction of  discursive complexity; to give continuity to the debate; and, to allow 
actors to engage beyond their area of  expertise.  
The reduction of  discursive complexity can be seen in how the story-lines assemble different 
elements of  hydropower — for example, consultation and compensation plans with principles of  
democratic decision-making — to reproduce the story-line as coherent. While Story-line 1 holds 
that communities are neither adequately consulted nor compensated in respect to the impacts they 
face this is seen as directly coupled with non-democratic principles of  an elite’s claim to represent 
the masses.  
Story-line 3 on the other hand argue that Cambodia’s need to develop requires compelling plans for 
the masses to accept the path chosen. The wills of  communities are — in contrast to Story-line 1 — 
not to determine the direction. Consultation is not allowed to jeopardize the path in its entirety but 
as a mean to the end of  smooth development. Further, Story-line 3 holds a strong belief  in human 
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ability to manage and control the river, replace lost livelihoods and that the value of, and benefits 
from, a completed hydroelectric plant is greater than that of  leaving the area untouched. The 
untouched area is not seen to supply resources fungible to use to reach the goal of  becoming a 
modern state. Contrastively, Story-line 1 contend the notion that ecosystems and ecosystem services, 
cultures and traditions are to be seen as interchangeable in value and meaning to man-made 
structures; i.e. this Story-line argues that the untouched area has an inherent value. Story-line 1 and 
3 therefore take different ontological perspectives to the environment, economic development and 
the people within. In summary, strong hydropower proponents tended to emphasis economic aspects 
of  sustainable development succeeded by the environmental and social. Opponents on the other 
hand demonstrated a reversed tendency while a middle-track expresses difficulties in connecting the 
two extremes. 
Another considerable divergence found pertains to Cambodia’s role, and experienced impacts from 
the construction of  hydroelectricity in upstream riparians. While respondents adhering to different 
story-lines primarily and most frequently referred to Laos and Viet Nam, China was also 
mentioned. While the three story-lines all acknowledge some degree of  negative impacts to 
Cambodia from these upstream developments, they are framed and incorporated in Story-lines 1 
and 3 in diametrically opposite manners leading to different conclusions of  what the next steps 
should be. In Story-line 1 it is taken as evidence for the harmful impacts of  hydropower and 
interprets as something that should not be brought to Cambodia as more of  the adverse effects will 
be brought along; this time without possibility to blame other countries. In Story-line 3 upstream 
development is framed to carry benefits to upstream neighbors while negative impacts becomes the 
downstream burden. As such, upstream dams justify construction in Cambodia in being the only 
way to reap some benefits before it is too late.  
The above constitutes a collective action problem (Ostrom, 1990) referring to challenges of  holistic 
river basin management as described in Section 4.2. While each country seeks to accrue the largest 
amount of  benefits possible from the resource, impacts are transboundary and particularly 
downstream. As such impacts are both unevenly shared and riparians bear a biased incentive 
towards the construction of  dams as well as regional cooperation. Story-line 1 can be seen to argue 
for a caesurae to prevent everybody being left off  worse by an overall deterioration of  the river while 
Story-line 3 — arguing for the manageability of  negative impacts — take negative impacts from 
upstream construction as a sign that they need to tap in before it is too late. Story-line 3 as such 
tangents a presumed upstream-country position and reflects the presence of  wider aspects of  
international relations at play. Consequently, upstream dams can be seen as both enabling and 
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necessitating construction downstream; and, a sovereignty-centered collective action problem 
treading towards a tragedy of  the commons scenario (Hardin, 1968).  
The different approaches to the River as a common-pool resource — and what actions Cambodia’s 
downstream position requires — is a pivotal piece to understand the two extremes’ stance on 
hydropower. It is also central to the difficulties expressed by actors in Story-line 2 that wish to 
occupy a space in the middle facilitating the conception of  a constructive dialogue where the two 
extremes are foreseen to unite forces. With Story-line 1 pursuing a critique of  the system as a whole, 
its institutions, methods and the righteousness of  its goals, Story-line 3 tenure within the system and 
identify the opposition not only as a threat to the Story-line’s perpetuance but to Cambodia’s 
warranted prosperity after decades of  struggle. 
Three emblematic elements have emerged through this research, one of  each story-line. The first is 
the rural communities as not at all represented or misrepresented and thus constituting a 
marginalized group on Cambodia’s development train. The second is the need to reconvene 
extreme positions to the middle where an aggregate of  the best possible collection of  information 
and wills, technical solutions and strategies takes lead. The third is the authority of  economic 
development to accompany the country’s process from a least developed country status into an 
affluent and healthy society.  
The idea that hydropower proponents aren’t transparent or kind enough makes it easy for 
opponents to play the blame-game while proponents only living up to minimum requirements fuel 
these claims. Meanwhile at the other bank, the idea that hydropower opponents are just trying to 
restrict and complicate development makes it easier for proponents to disregard them while 
unlawful or denigrate acts by opponents allow its maintenance. In the middle are actors seeing a 
need to engage, but who remain hesitant due to the risk of  exposure to a two-fronted critique.  
“… you’re either with us or against us it sounds like George W. Bush you know, it’s crazy, but this is how polarized it has become.” 
(Interview 24) 
Viewing the story-lines as relational the reproduction of  the sustainable development discourse is 
two-fold. First, in their interpretation each story-line reproduce the meaning of  sustainable 
development, how the aspects relate to each other and what actions ought to be prioritized. Second, 
the ambiguity of  sustainable development from the aspects of  the three story-lines presented is 
reproduced by their relations. Accordingly, the multi-interpretability of  the sustainable development 
#  of  #40 51
Johannes Nilsson CHAPTER SIX | CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
concept relies on the struggle between the story-lines. Further, the lacuna created by polarization of  
Story-line 1 and 3 enabled the existence of  Story-line 2 by the very struggle of  being in the middle. 
As pointed out in Section 3.1, the many possible interpretations of  sustainable development can be 
seen as both the concept’s strength and its weakness. Firstly, in line with my ontological and 
epistemological stances to the thesis subject, I argue that the first is more prominent than the latter. 
A concept that contributes to such significant amounts of  passionate discussions, conceptual and 
theoretical explorations as well as practical actions must be seen as one with a strong traction; de 
facto permitted through its vague expedient. The relational stance gives additional weight to one 
interpretation’s need of  another to exist, and the argumentative approach’s description of  story-
lines’ facilitation of  reducing discursive complexity to stabilize and give continuity to the debate 
further legitimize that the Sustainable Development Story-line should be ambiguous. Thus, while one 
will be initially uncertain to what a sole reference to sustainable development actually implies, it is 
certain there are ample reasons to delve into a deep discussion with endless aspects. 
However, power inequities may prohibit deliberations and exclude some story-lines, discursive 
elements or discourse-coalitions. Considering that some disputed projects proceed despite objection, 
and the kinship of  strong financial actors to Story-line 3, it might, at a first glance, be interpreted 
that Story-line 1 is marginalized in the struggle for discursive hegemony. Yet, in this case it is not 
necessarily so.  
Although the two Story-lines 1 and 3 draw sometimes diametrically opposing conclusions to what 
should be done, Story-line 3 must adopt the language of  Story-line 1 to remain credible and 
included in the global discourse-coalition (cf. section 3.2.1). This dependence on opponent 
characterizations is transmitted to institutions, for example the draft EIA Law. As such, in the 
struggle for discursive hegemony Story-line 3 depends on ideas and discursive elements 
characterizing Story-line 1 in its present discourse structuration as well as institutionalization (cf. section 
3.2.3). Consequently, it is possible to argue that Story-line 1, not Story-line 3, drives (part of) the 
hegemonic discourse. This can be described as a next level of  ambiguity where Story-lines 1, 2 and 
3 protrude the Sustainable Development Story-line and create a complexity that needs to be 
reduced in order to facilitate the discursive closure and preserve sustainable development’s multi-
interpretability. 
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The findings, and indeed the entire realization of  the thesis, are to be seen through the lens of  the 
social constructivist relational ontological and interpretivist epistemological stance as declared in 
Chapter 2. The outcomes — i.e. story-lines, discourse-coalitions, discursive-elements and discursive 
closure — are as such to be regarded as particular realities of  hydropower, existing not so much in 
their own capacity but in relation to one another. These are in turn social constructions composed 
through the interpretations of  the author’s relation to the subject matter. While admittedly only 
representing a few of  the possible realities, the applied approach has allowed for a comprehensive 
yet tangible presentation informed directly by some of  the many actors involved in reproducing the 
discourses. The story-line approach further granted the thesis the ability to reduce the discursive 
complexity of  the problem and can in itself  be seen as a story-line enabling the author to engage in 
elements of  the debate beyond his own area of  expertise. The discursive closure carried by the 
thesis’ story-line is therefore that hydropower in Cambodia is to be regarded as “Competing 
Discursive Story-lines of  a Contested Development Path”.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The thesis has investigated the realities of  hydropower development through key actors’ positions in 
the Mekong River Basin with a focus on the Cambodian perspective. This was done through an 
empirical investigation of  various discourses leading multiple interpretations of  the role of  
hydropower in contributing to or restricting sustainable development in Southeast Asia. 
A significant portion of  the research and reports done on hydropower in the Mekong Basin focuses 
on the actions of  one or a few actors or a narrow scope of  thematics, often to advocate a certain 
agenda or illustrate a certain benefit or impact. The thesis did not wish to continue on this lane of  
inquiry and instead set out to investigate the broader debate and the elements of  its discourses. This 
meant that a wide variety of  thematics needed to be considered in accordance with respondents’ 
arguments to different topics, status, trends and future scenarios. It also meant that the highest 
possible number of  actors had to be considered so to account for as close to the whole debate as 
possible. The many actors and aspects were an ongoing challenge but at the same necessary in order 
to divert from and be able to contribute to existing literature. 
A main theme that goes through the entire thesis is the actors’ adherence to, or separation from, the 
notion of  the fungibility of  the environment ‘out there’ in the environmental conflict. I here refer to the 
conflict between actors who see the environment as having value and functions that are possible to 
directly translate into man-made structures or systems; hence an anthropocentric perspective where 
nature is here to serve humans. Those seeing it so, naturally see little problem in changing or 
disrupting ecosystems for other uses. Others see the environment as having an inherent value, 
reflected through cultures, traditions, livelihoods and more. With this perspective any disruptions of  
an ecosystem result in the loss of  an irreplaceable value and harm to its reflections. The question is 
thus, for example, is fish in the river, and the act of  catching it, exchangeable with tucking a fish that 
spawned and bred in a pool? The answer depends on which story-line, or set of  story-lines, one has 
and inclination towards. 
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Appendix I - Informed Consent Form  
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Mr. Johannes Nilsson from Lund 
University. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about ‘Alternative 
interpretations to hydropower as a sustainable energy source in the Mekong Basin, its possible 
benefits and impacts for Cambodia in a transboundary political context’. I will be one of  several 
people interviewed for this research. 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my 
participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation or decline to answer any question 
at any time without any penalty or consequences. 
2. I have been introduced to the researcher Mr. Johannes Nilsson, his affiliation to Lund 
University, the thesis topic, background, purpose, aim, methods and my role. 
3. I understand that the collected data will be treated confidentially and stored safely; that the 
collected data will only be used for the Masters thesis; and, that the Masters thesis will be 
published at a public website managed by Lund University Library, Sweden. 
4. I agree that the interview and subsequent dialogue is taped for use by the researcher only:  
 Yes 
 No, I prefer notes be kept by the researcher. 
5. I agree to be quoted in the thesis: 
 Yes, with my name and professional affiliation;  
 Yes, but not with my name and professional affiliation; 
 No, I do not agree to be quoted. I wish my participation to be confidential. Subsequent uses 
of  records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the 
confidentiality of  individuals and institutions. 
6. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions 
answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. 
7. I have been given a copy of  this consent form. 
Date:  
Signature of  the Researcher	 	 	 	 Signature of  the Respondent 
_____________________________	 	 	 _____________________________ 
Mr. Johannes Nilsson	 	 	 	 	 	 	  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Appendix II - Interview Guide 
1. What is sustainable development for you/ your organization? 
2. Can you please reflect on existing and planned hydropower development in the Mekong River? 
a) What is your reflection focusing on Cambodia’s downstream position on the river and 
hydropower development? 
3. To some degree I would say one will have to prioritize, or make trade-offs, between economic, 
social and environmental aspects (examples) in development projects, would you agree? 
a) Can you please reflect on your/ your organizations priorities? 
4. As you may be aware, some organizations/ institutions make other priorities, what is your 
reflection on this? 
5. Looking back at the last ten years, 
a) how would your characterize the debate on hydropower then and now? 
b) how would you characterize relationships between different actors engaged in hydropower 
in Cambodia? 
c) how would you characterize the relationships between Mekong riparians? 
6. Is there anything you think I should have asked that I have not? 
7. Is it ok that I reconnect with you if  I have any follow up questions? 
8. Do you have any questions for me? 
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Appendix III - Interview Reference Codes 
Calum ‘LMB’ refers to respondents that are nationals of  an LMB riparian. Column ‘non-LMB’ 
refers to respondents that are not nationals of  an LMB riparian. Column ‘Rec’ 0=not recorded, 
1=recorded. Column ‘cluster’ 0=non-affiliated informant.  
LMB non-LMB Rec Rec min Cluster Ref  Code
#1 1 0 - 0 Interview 1 
#2 1 0 - 1 Interview 2 
#3 1 0 - 2 Interview 3
#4 1 0 - 2 Interview 4
#5 3 1 54m 56s 2 Interview 5
#6 1 0 - 2 Interview 6
#7 1 1 28m 22s 2 Interview 7
#8 2 2 1 1h 1m 14s 1 Interview 8
#9 1 1 0 - 0 Interview 9
#10 1 0 - 0 Interview 10
#11 1 0 - 0 Interview 11
#12 1 0 - 2 Interview 12
#13 1 1 1h 1m 46s 1 Interview 13
#14 2 1 48m 10s 2 Interview 14
#15 1 0 - 2 Interview 15
#16 1 1 47m 38s 1 Interview 16
#17 1 1 29m 59s 1 Interview 17
#18 1 1 50m 1s 1 Interview 18
#19 1 0 - 0 Interview 19
#20 1 1 27m 9s 2 Interview 20
#21 1 1 1h 31m 32s 2 Interview 21
#22 2 1 38m 52s 2 Interview 22
#23 1 1 30m 50s 3 Interview 23
#24 1 1 28m 35s 0 Interview 24
#25 2 1 47m 7s 2 Interview 25
#26 1 0 - 2 Interview 26
#27 2 0 - 3 Interview 27
#28 1 1 1h 5m 35s 3 Interview 28
#29 1 0 - 3 Interview 29
#30 1 0 - 0 Interview 30
#31 1 1 25m 51s 2 Interview 31
#32 1 1 20m 58s 0 Interview 32
#33 1 0 2 Interview 33
#34 1 0 - 0 Interview 34
#35 1 0 - 0 Interview 35
#36 1 0 - 1 Interview 36
#37 1 0 - 1 Interview 37
TOTAL 24 23 17 12h 38m 35s
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Appendix IV - Ministry Response Letter 
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